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Introduction 
Feminists, like members of other oppressed groups, are likely to embrace 
many aspects of Albert Memmi’s profound analysis of domination and 
oppression. Even though feminists can find common cause with Memmi in 
many respects, nevertheless they are likely to find themselves at odds with 
what Memmi says and does not say about women.  Susan Gilson Miller, in 
her afterword to Memmi’s The Colonizer and the Colonized (1965), foregrounds 
this omission of women from the work and observes: 
Memmi’s view of women, for example, reflects a male-centered 
stance that the author himself has come to regret.  In this work 
colonizer and colonized are always men, both implicitly and 
explicitly. No women are mentioned among those longing to be 
free.1 
Memmi’s omission of women from The Colonizer and the Colonized, Miller 
continues, does not only pertain to their role as the colonized but extends 
equally to their position as the colonizer, inasmuch as “…we know that 
women were agents on both sides in the process of colonization and 
decolonization…”2 As a result, female readers of all backgrounds will be 
unlikely to find their own specific experiences addressed in this important 
text. 
This difficulty is compounded for black feminists in light of a parallel 
omission of race from Memmi’s analysis, which, along with the influences of 
gender and class, forms the matrix of black women’s oppression.  bell hooks, 
for instance, has criticized Memmi and other writers of his era for the 
limitations of their analyses of oppression.  On her view, one cannot struggle 
against one aspect of oppression – such as racism – but at the same time 
remain complicit with other aspects of oppression – such as classism or 
sexism.  She cautions that “their ambivalent relationship to oppression in 
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general is a contradiction that must be resolved, or they will daily 
undermine their own radical work.”3 On hooks’s view, the struggle against 
oppression cannot be piecemeal but instead must grapple with the matrix of 
all types of oppression, and Memmi’s account of colonialism falls prey 
precisely to this sort of difficulty.  
The feminist and black feminist critiques of Memmi will form the 
starting point for this paper. While the first part of this paper will develop 
and deepen the basis for this critique of Memmi’s omission of gender and 
race from his early work on oppression, this critical gesture will not be the 
end point. In spite of its shortcomings, I do not think that feminists (either 
black or white) should dismiss Memmi’s analysis of colonization altogether. 
Quite the contrary, they ought to draw from resources already developed 
within their own discourses in order to enhance and creatively extend 
Memmi’s work.  As one example of what this might yield, I turn to the work 
of the black feminist Audre Lorde, and in particular, her work on the 
productive power of anger. I will show that Memmi’s failure to appreciate 
the legitimate role of anger at the colonial system, its oppression and 
humiliating effects upon the colonized, restricts his understanding of the 
range of legitimate responses to oppression. By bringing Memmi and Lorde 
into dialogue, we can thus show how the productive use of anger can be an 
important tool for combatting oppression.  
 
The Duo of the Colonizer and the Colonized  
Memmi’s work throughout his career is guided by the notion of the duo, 
which is expressed in terms of binaries such as man/woman, white/black, 
Jew/Arab, first generation immigrant/second generation immigrant, and so 
forth.  The most famous of these duos is that of colonizer/colonized, which 
forms the centerpiece of his work The Colonizer and the Colonized.  There 
Memmi begins by sketching a portrait of the colonizer.  The romantic vision 
of the colonizer depicts “a tall man, bronzed by the sun, wearing Wellington 
boots, proudly leaning on a shovel.”4 This man is envisioned as both an 
“adventurer” and “righteous pioneer”5 to be admired and emulated.  Yet, 
Memmi sees through this mythical image with the following observation: “I 
don’t know whether this portrait ever did correspond to reality or whether it 
was limited to the engravings on colonial bank notes.”6  By unmasking this 
mythic image, Memmi seeks to paint a more realistic portrait of the 
colonizer, one that is more attuned to the nefariousness of the colonial 
undertaking.   
One way that he does this is by linking the portrait of the colonizer to 
the quest for money and profit.  Instead of seeing the colonizer as a modern 
day Prometheus who brings light to dark humanity, Memmi regards the 
colonizer as one who is on a  “voyage toward an easier life.”7  There is 
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nothing romantic or noble about the colonizer or the colonial undertaking, 
instead the colonizer is depicted as someone who is ineffective in his home 
country and who seeks success by living elsewhere and off the backs of 
others.    This realization quickly becomes apparent to the colonizer himself: 
Actually this is not long in coming.  For how long could he fail to 
see the misery of the colonized and the relation of that misery to his 
own comfort? He realizes that this easy profit is so great only 
because it is wrested from others.  In short, he finds two things in 
one: he discovers the existence of the colonizer [sic] as he discovers 
his own privilege.8 
Privilege is the dividing line that separates the condition of the colonizer 
from that of the colonized. It comes in many different forms: the colonizer 
earns higher wages than the colonized; the colonizer has access to better 
jobs; he is protected by his flag; state exams are given in his language.9  
Along with these privileges, there are also some supposed “hardships” 
connected to colonial life:  
Repelled by its climate [the colony’s], ill at ease in the midst of its 
strangely dressed crowds, lonely for his native country, the 
problem would be whether or not to accept these nuisances and 
discomforts in exchange for the advantage of a colony.10   
In spite of the “discomforts” of colonial life, Memmi surmises that the 
colonizer will choose not to return home again, asking: “How can he return 
to his homeland if this would mean cutting his standard of living in half?”11  
In spite of the supposed hardships of colonial life, there is little incentive for 
the colonizer to change the colonial situation.  
 The second half of Memmi’s text provides the reader with what he 
calls a “Mythical Portrait of the Colonized.”  This portrait, like the romantic 
vision of the colonizer, is also fictitious because it too plays the role of 
justifying colonial privilege. Memmi identifies three particular qualities of 
the colonized subject that are constructed by the colonizer:  laziness, the lack 
of autonomy, and the lack of liberty.  
 The characterization of the colonized as “lazy” sets up another one of 
Memmi’s important duos. If the colonized is lazy, then it is the colonizer who 
is industrious and deserving of higher wages and a better standard living.  
The laziness of the colonized is reinforced through jokes and exaggerated 
language about the colonized so that:  
Nothing can describe well enough the extraordinary deficiency of 
the colonized.  He [the colonizer] becomes lyrical about it…the 
colonized doesn’t let grass grow under his feet, but a tree, and what 
tree! A eucalyptus, an American centenarian oak! A tree? No, a 
forest!12  
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Behind the joking lies the true intention of the colonizer.  The false 
accusation of laziness becomes embedded in the very being of the 
colonized—the colonized did not become lazy, nor is his relationship to 
labor seen as an appropriate response to his subjugation—he was born that 
way.  Following Memmi’s line of reasoning, it is not a far jump from 
viewing the colonized as inherently lazy to viewing him as a “weakling” 
and from there to viewing him as someone who “…requires protection.  
From this comes the concept of a protectorate.”13  
Another feature of the mythical portrait of the colonized is that 
colonized people are regarded as one person rather than many individuals—
put another way, there is no recognition of individuality.  Memmi calls this 
“the mark of the plural” since “the colonized is never characterized in a 
individual manner; he is entitled only to drown in an anonymous 
collectivity.”14  As a result, the colonizer speaks about the colonized through 
generalizations; phrases like “They are this” and “They are all the same”15 
are ubiquitous in the language of the colonizer.   
The final feature of the colonized is that they lack “liberty.”16 Memmi 
sums up this lack of liberty as the inability of the colonized to choose 
freedom over bondage.  Memmi writes:  
The colonized has no way out of this state of woe—neither a legal 
outlet (naturalization) nor a religious outlet (conversion). The 
colonized is not free to choose between being colonized or not 
being colonized.17   
This leads Memmi to ask: “What is left of the colonized at the end of this 
stubborn effort to dehumanize him?” His answer is that the colonizer’s 
“supreme ambition” is for the colonized to “exist only as a function of the 
needs of the colonizer i.e., to be transformed into a pure colonized.”18  In this 
way, Memmi’s duo of the colonizer and the colonized ultimately implodes 
on itself. By becoming a “pure colonized,” the colonized person is “no 
longer an alter ego of the colonizer,” because he is no longer recognized as 
human at all.19 
 
Memmi and the Status of Colonized Women 
There can be little doubt that the above description speaks to the plight of 
the colonized man, but the question remains open as to whether the 
colonized woman can see herself in Memmi’s analysis.  Certainly, the 
colonized woman can identify with the colonizer’s mythic portrayal of the 
colonized as lazy, depersonalized and lacking autonomy, inasmuch as these 
characterizations are also applied to them. Yet, it still seems that the 
exploitation of the colonized is presented from a decidedly masculine 
orientation. The easiest way to see this is through Memmi’s use of the 
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gendered pronouns he and him.  One might respond, in defense of Memmi, 
that these pronouns are used in conformity with older standards of 
correctness and that they can simply be replaced with feminine pronouns or 
the neutral pronoun “one.” However, this response can easily be disarmed if 
we look at some actual examples of the colonized and the colonial situation. 
There we find that the examples themselves reflect a decidedly male 
perspective, which cannot be corrected simply by the substitution of the 
pronoun her for him. A good example of this comes from Memmi’s analysis 
of the public sphere in the chapter “Situations of the Colonized.”  
This chapter, which examines the role of citizenship and the lack of civic 
participation by the colonized, depicts the public sphere exclusively as a 
male space.  The colonizer, as noted above, believes that the colonized lacks 
an interest and ability for self-rule. This implies that, even if the colonized 
did display an interest in the workings of the government, they would be 
incapable of self-government.  Their supposed apathy can be explained in 
the following way:  
The fact is that the colonized does not govern.  Being kept away 
from power, he ends up by losing both interest and feeling for 
control…among the colonized few men are suitable for 
government.  How could such a long absence from autonomous 
government give rise to skill?”20   
Memmi does not dispute the claim that the colonized display a lack of 
interest in government, but this cannot be attributed either to laziness or a 
lack of ability. Instead, their lack of interest in government is due to their 
historical exclusion from the practice of governing.   
What is especially interesting, for our purposes, is to consider how 
Memmi extends this analysis to the circumstance of the children of the 
colonized.  Memmi states: “Not considering himself a citizen, the colonized 
likewise loses all hope of seeing his son achieve citizenship.”21  The son of 
the colonized realizes that the only way that he can change his situation is 
through revolt. But, as Memmi observes, the desire to revolt eventually 
withers away as one grows older. Sooner or later, “the potential rebel falls 
back on the traditional values” due to his familial connections and 
obligations.  When this occurs: “The young man will marry, will become a 
devoted father, reliable brother, responsible uncle and, until he takes his 
father’s place, a respectful son.”22  This example clearly demonstrates that 
this retreat from the public sphere is linked with the domain of the feminine.  
The private sphere, as Memmi goes on to describe, exerts a negative 
influence over the public life of the son:  “He will remain glued to that 
family which offers him warmth and tenderness but which simultaneously 
absorbs, clutches and emasculates him.”23 By disparaging the only sphere in 
which women’s presence is acknowledged – the private sphere – I want to 
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suggest that Memmi resists one form of oppression but participates in 
another one.  
To make this point, we can turn to a related point that bell hooks makes 
with regard to the continuation of unequal gender roles during the 
enslavement of Africans in the United States. hooks notes that it is often 
argued that the American enslavement of black men amounted to the 
emasculation of black men and that black society today still suffers the 
effects of this loss.  “Implicit in this assertion,” hooks observes, “is the 
assumption that the worst that can happen to a man is that he be made to 
assume the social status of woman.”24 In response, hooks counters that the 
system of patriarchy actually went unchallenged during enslavement:  
No annals of history record that the masses of black male slaves 
were forced to execute roles traditionally performed exclusively by 
women.  Evidence to the contrary exists, documenting the fact that 
there were many tasks enslaved African men would not perform 
because they regarded them as “female” work.25 
In this way patriarchy was upheld through the different types of work 
assigned to black men and women—black women performed the cooking 
and the cleaning for their white enslavers as well as in their own domiciles.  
hooks goes on to claim that black enslavement did not feminize black men, 
instead it masculinized black women. Many black women toiled in the 
fields.  Since fieldwork was considered men’s work, black women lost their 
standing as women, and because they were no longer seen as women, this 
allowed all types of atrocities to be committed against them.26 Sojourner’s 
Truth’s question, “ain’t I a woman?,” is a direct response to that situation.  
 hooks’ analysis can, in my opinion, be extended to illuminate Memmi’s 
depiction of the colonial context.  Memmi associates the oppression that 
takes place in the colonial situation with “emasculation.” Colonialism 
emasculates the colonized male by excluding him from the public sphere 
and relegating him to the private sphere, the domain of women. In this way, 
Memmi’s account reflects his position as a colonized male in a society that 
oppresses women. What he fails to see is how his own duo set up between 
the male public sphere and the female private sphere embodies another type 
of oppression – gender inequality – which excludes women from the public 
sphere. His endorsement of this duo in his analysis leads him not to see 
women as the object of colonization.  If women fare poorly under colonial 
oppression, it is assumed that this is because their freedom is adjunct to that 
of colonized men. That is to say that if men become free, it is assumed that 
women will become free in turn.  If this is the case, then hooks’s critique of 
scholars who privilege the experiences of enslaved black men can be 
extended to the privilege that Memmi grants to the experiences of colonized 
men. For both, “what matters most among the experiences of men is their 
ability to assert themselves patriarchally.”27 
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 Moreover, in the Colonizer and the Colonized, Memmi never 
acknowledges that women may have distinctive constraints on them related 
to their status as women in an unequal society, such as rape, sexual assault, 
work restrictions, and limitations of public participation. These constraints, 
while part of the colonial situation, are not simply the product of 
colonization. They are, more broadly, part of the fabric of gender hierarchies 
that preceded colonization – part of societies that already relegated them to 
live solely in the private sphere. Here we come to see the crux of the 
problem. Feminists of all kinds are not likely to find their experiences or 
their condition voiced adequately in the Colonizer and the Colonized.  Memmi 
only addresses one aspect of the oppression that exists in the colonial 
situation but leaves the matrix of oppression untouched.  As a result, 
everything about the situation that he describes could be transformed 
without anything at all changing in the lives of colonized women. And, if 
that is the case, what use can his work have for feminists of any kind? 
 
Salvaging Memmi      
Admittedly, Memmi’s point of view is not very different from those of many 
other postcolonial thinkers of his time and later such as Frantz Fanon, Aimé 
Cesaire, and Chinua Achebe. Memmi and his counterparts either do not see 
or at least fail to acknowledge that colonized women have a relationship to 
colonization that is different from that of the colonized male subject. This is 
why, as Tracy Sharpley-Whiting points out, many feminist scholars are 
critical of Fanon, especially of his work Black Skin/White Mask. They object, 
much as we have done in the preceding section with respect to Memmi, to 
his use of “masculine referents,” to “his use of the masculine as normative,” 
to his “rigid constructions of gender and sexuality,” to his “erasure of (black) 
feminine subjectivities,” and to his “grossly reductive discussion of (white) 
women.”28  Although Sharpley-Whiting understands these criticisms of 
Fanon, she nonetheless maintains that his work can be useful to feminist 
scholarship. After briefly considering her rationale for this, similarly I want 
to propose that feminists should undertake a salvaging effort of Memmi’s 
work as well. 
Several factors, as Sharpley-Whiting notes, complicate Fanon’s theory 
regarding the situation of colonized women and their resistance to 
colonization.   First, Fanon studied psychiatry in France and practiced in 
Algeria, but he did not have the opportunity to record the impact of 
colonization on the women of Martinique.  Second, many of Fanon’s most 
important observations on colonization come from his time in Algeria where 
the majority of his patients were Muslim men and European women.29  And 
although Fanon is acutely aware that Algerian women were profoundly 
impacted by sexual violence, for example, such things were not openly 
discussed. Sharpley-Whiting notes:  
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If sexual silence plagues contemporary Arab women, even to the 
point of censorship on the subject among women themselves, one 
can very well imagine the codes of sexual silence in the 1950s and 
1960s and subsequently to Fanon’s inability to write extensively on 
the sexual lives of sexual neuroses of Algerian women.30  
Regardless of Fanon’s inability to fully assess the condition of colonized 
women, Sharpley-Whiting still sees Fanon as a feminist ally—one who 
perhaps worked harder for women’s liberation than those who claim to be 
feminists.  Sharpley-Whiting rightly contends: 
Fanon believed in and worked for the liberation of the damned of 
the earth, “men and women who are colonized.” He interrogated 
and challenged specifically the contradictions in women’s lives… 
Fanon believed that revolution would transform the exploitative 
and oppressive spheres of formal and informal political, social, and 
economic life for men, women, and children—humanity from the 
bottom up.31  
Like Fanon, Memmi was also profoundly constrained by the customs and 
dictates of his society, but he was also committed to the liberation of the 
oppressed.  
In The Pillar of Salt (1955), a loosely autobiographical account of his 
youth in Tunisia, Memmi is clearly aware that there is a difference between 
the fate of his sister and himself. This difference is shown in the roles 
assigned when they play: 
In an old tin can in which tobacco was sold we put the semolina we 
made from chalky plaster we scrapped from between loose stones 
in the walls.  Measuring and mixing very seriously, I played the 
part of the grocer while Kalla [Memmi’s sister] was the housewife: 
as among grown-ups, I benefited from the masculine privileges.32 
This and other instances throughout his text show that Memmi’s society and 
religion33 was guided by gender roles that limited women to the private 
sphere of the home and the family.  
In spite of such examples, it does not seem accurate to label Memmi’s 
writing anti-woman or misogynistic. Instead, I would like to propose that 
Memmi is a “masculinist” writer, which, as explained by Joy James, refers to 
someone who:  
…can share patriarchy’s presupposition of the male as normative 
without its antifemale politics and rhetoric.  Men who support 
feminist politics, as protofeminists, may advocate the equality or 
even occasionally for the superiority of women…however, even 
without the patriarchal intent some works may replicate 
conventional gender roles.34 
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As a masculinst, Memmi uses language that supports male normativity and 
uncritically replicates stereotypical gender roles. Yet, his language is never 
explicitly anti-female.  Indeed, Memmi is apologetic of the role that he 
played in the oppression of women. In Dominated Man (1968) he writes: 
For the first time in my life I am on the wrong side of the fence: in 
talking about women, I observe, with embarrassment and a touch 
of malice that this time I am to be counted among the oppressors.35 
Based on this supposition that Memmi is a masculinst but not a misogynist, 
the task of feminist readings of Memmi becomes more clearly defined. 
Instead of looking for the places where women are excluded, the point is to 
look for places where women are able to insert themselves into Memmi’s 
discourse. This new dialogue, as I will show below, can be beneficial to 
Memmi and feminism alike.  On the one hand, it enhances Memmi’s overall 
analysis of the colonial situation by extending it to aspects that he was 
unable to glimpse, while on the other hand, it enriches feminist discourse by 
providing new resources to use in the struggle against oppression. As an 
example of the creative potential of such a dialogue, I will draw inspiration 
from the work of the feminist Audre Lorde. 
 
Audre Lorde’s Rhetorical Uses of Anger 
One clear way that Audre Lorde’s work converges with the work of Memmi 
is in her analysis of anger.  Lorde, in her essay “The Uses of Anger: Women 
Responding to Racism,” sees anger as a justified and reasonable response to 
racial violence.  According to Lorde, racism is “the belief in the inherent 
superiority of one race over all others and thereby the right to dominance, 
manifest and implied.”36 Anger is perhaps a natural response to racism: 
“Women responding to racism means women responding to anger; the 
anger of exclusion, of unquestioned privilege, of racial distortions, or silence, 
ill-use, stereotyping, defensiveness, misnaming, betrayal, and co-optation.”37   
Lorde, like many black women, is aware of the pitfall that anger holds 
for women in general and for black women in particular.  A controlling 
image38 commonly used to manage the behavior of black women is that of 
the angry black woman. Like the angry black man who is depicted as a threat 
to the security and safety of society, there is also a social fear of the angry 
black woman.  Interestingly enough, as Philip Kretsedemas observes, images 
of the angry black woman seem to be increasingly prevalent in the media 
today:  
Much of the recent criticism of black media stereotypes has focused 
on portrayal of women.  Some scholars and media critics have 
argued that these media depictions have become distinctly more 
negative over the past two decades and that stereotypes of black 
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women have begun to eclipse the more familiar stereotypes of the 
aggressive black male.39   
The angry black woman is the epitome of irrationality—responding 
disproportionately to the slightest trigger. This leaves her beyond sympathy 
or understanding in the eyes of the general public.  Like other controlling 
images, the angry black women stereotype functions primarily to show 
society how to behave toward black women and indirectly shows the black 
woman how not to behave if she hopes to avoid social scorn.40 For, the 
smallest roll of an eye or snap of the head could totally discredit anything a 
black woman has to say.   
While Lorde understands the tremendous amount of social pressure on 
black women not to display their anger, she believes that black women pay a 
steep price when they do not allow themselves to do so. She begins by 
describing her experience of suppressing her own anger: “once I did it in 
silence, afraid of the weight.  My fear of anger taught me nothing.”41 For 
Lorde, anger is not simply a negative or destructive feeling. It can also be 
instructive for black women themselves and to other people in general. 
Lorde goes on to describe a number of other situations that make her 
angry for legitimate reasons. One of these includes an event where “a well-
known white American women poet interrupts the reading of the work of a 
woman of Color to read her own poem, and then dashes off to an ‘important 
panel.’”42  Lorde is angered by the rudeness of the white female poet, but 
she is also angered that this woman may not have been able to see the 
racism and white privilege embedded in her action.  In another instance, a 
white female academic applauds the appearance of “a collection by non-
Black women of Color,” because, as she explains to Lorde, “it allows me to 
deal with racism without dealing with the harshness of black women.”43  
Through these examples, Lorde is addressing white women who may 
“recognize these attitudes as familiar” as well as the women of color “who 
live and survive thousands of such encounters.” Like her, she suspects that 
they “tremble their rage under harness, or who sometimes question the 
express of our race as useless and disruptive (the two most popular 
accusations).”44 Her message is that such moments provide an opportunity 
for the positive use of anger in which the expression of anger “can become a 
powerful source of energy serving progress and change.”45  Some people 
may remain silent in response to sexism or racism, because they do not want 
to be labeled as disruptive or worse yet – angry.  But, according to Lorde, 
these are moments where anger should not be silenced but rather channeled 
into action: “anger expressed and translated into action in the service of our 
vision and our future is a liberating and strengthening act of clarification, for 
it is in the painful process of this translation that we identify who are our 
allies with whom we have grave differences, and who are our genuine 
enemies.”46     
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One might suppose from reading Memmi and Lorde that they would 
share similar views and that Memmi would easily be able to endorse the 
above description of anger.  After all, Lorde is a black feminist theorist who 
is fiercely opposed to the politics of Western domination, while Memmi is a 
postcolonial thinker opposed to a related domination in his homeland. 
Additionally, Memmi’s definition of racism is similar to Lorde’s.  He defines 
it as: “the generalized and final assigning of values to real or imaginary 
differences, to the accuser’s benefit and at his victim’s expense, in order to 
justify the former’s own privileges or aggression.”47 Yet in spite of their 
shared understanding of racism, and the marginalization and dis-
enfranchisement that both denounce, it might be surprising for readers to 
discover that Memmi actually repudiates anger as an appropriate response 
to oppression.   In his long-awaited sequel to The Colonizer and the Colonizer – 
Decolonization and the Decolonized (2006) – Memmi offers an interesting but 
controversial evaluation of the decolonized’s feelings of anger. Memmi 
rejects the anger that the decolonized feel and even goes so far as to claim 
that anger begets nothing.  On Memmi’s account, there is no viable use of 
anger, because it does not change the material condition of the decolonized 
citizen.  Instead, he associates anger with dolorism, which signifies a feeling 
of general helplessness. In the section “Diversions, Excuses, and Myths,” he 
goes on to reproach black Americans for their dolorism as well: 
Black Americans are not decolonized people, although they have 
certain traits in common with them, just as they have certain traits 
in common with the colonized.  But their evasive responses are the 
same.  It is the fault of history, it is always the fault of the whites.  
Dolorism is a natural tendency to exaggerate one’s pains and 
attribute them to another.  Like the decolonized, as long as blacks 
have not freed themselves of dolorism, they will never be able to 
correctly analyze their condition and act accordingly.48 
Dolorism is paralyzing because it leaves one unable to move beyond one’s 
situation.  It leads one to blame one’s problems on others, but it does not 
provide the tools for overcoming one’s problems.   
The same might be said about the feeling of anger.  Like dolorism, the 
feeling of anger separates the decolonized from society.  This is apparent in 
his description of the immigrant in Decolonization and the Decolonized. 
Memmi observes that those who immigrate to their former colonizer’s 
nation often find themselves unable to assimilate and typically end up in a 
ghetto. These living conditions make clear to the immigrant: “the gap that 
continues to exist between former masters and the liberated.  The feeling of 
inequality, having become intolerable, nourishes a growing bitterness.”49  
For Memmi, the immigrant is to blame for this.  There is never a moment 
where he acknowledges either in The Colonizer and the Colonized or 
Decolonization and the Decolonized that subjugated people may be entitled to 
be angered, humiliated, and resentful about their situation.  At the core of 
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Memmi’s argument against anger is the fear that the colonized or formerly 
colonized person will become consumed with anger. This not only leads one 
to lose sight of the goal of liberation and equality but also of the tools that 
are necessary for overcoming this condition.  
 Memmi is not necessarily the first to denounce the anger that 
marginalized people feel in response to racism and discrimination. Black 
thinkers, like Booker T. Washington, have also suggested that anger is 
unproductive. Washington believed that the best way to deal with white 
society was not for blacks to become angered by their situation, instead he 
argued that the best response would be for blacks to work hard and produce 
wealth for themselves and their community.50 This economic advancement 
would become, in his opinion, a far more effective tool for combatting racial 
inequality than any display of anger or resentment. Some people, to be sure, 
have benefited from setting aside their anger and focusing primarily on their 
own advancement. Arnold Farr, for instance, responds to this view, 
however, when he observes that this strategy does more harm to black 
Americans than good because it does not deal effectively with the historical 
trauma of enslavement and dehumanization.51  
Lorde’s work on anger offers a different strategy. Against scholars like 
Memmi or Washington, she contends that ignoring one’s anger or keeping it 
bottled up “will teach you nothing.”52 Anger, on her view, has a constructive 
side; it is didactic. Anger, as Lorde puts it, “is loaded with information and 
energy.”53 Colonized and formerly colonized people can use anger to 
validate their response to oppression. Just as importantly, to deny a 
colonized person the right to feel and be angry is to deny him/her a natural 
and fitting response to injustice. Anger is, for Lorde, “an appropriate 
reaction to racist attitudes as is fury when the actions arising from those 
attitudes do not change.”54   
This section began by arguing that both Lorde and Memmi fear that 
colonized individuals will be further marginalized if they act out in anger.  
But this should not be the only fear that is explored.  Indeed Lorde, again, 
complicates the idea and refocuses the direction away from colonized 
people and onto the colonial subject when she asserts that: “To those women 
here who fear the anger of women of Color more than their own 
unscrutinized racist attitudes, I ask: Is the anger of women of Color more 
threatening than the woman-hatred that tinges all aspects of our lives?”55   
Lorde’s question has a profound significance for Memmi’s analysis. 
Instead of questioning the anger of the colonized, it suggests that Memmi 
might instead want to ask himself: “Is the anger of the colonized more 
threatening than the racism, ethnocentrism, sexism, and classism, that comes 
from the colonizer and tinges all aspects of lives of the colonized?”  To pose 
the question in this way, I think, would lead Memmi to broaden his analysis 
of colonization and decolonization in such a way that it would come to find 
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a place for anger as a form of righteous indignation. This is one way, among 
other possible ones, in which feminists can open the resources of Memmi’s 
analysis of colonial oppression onto multiple other struggles against 
oppression.     
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